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I. Introduction 
This paper deals with a recent judgment of the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ) in a case of alleged indirect sex-discrimination concerning part-
time workers. 1 In this judgment, the ECJ denies part-time workers the 
right to receive overtime-supplements when they exceed their 
contractually agreed working time. Is this judgment an example of 
backsliding by the ECJ into a formal approach to the principle of legal 
equality,2 or does it indicate the fundamental problems you encounter 
when you try to 'solve' systemic 'disadvantage' of women in paid labour 
with the help of sex-equality law? I will analyse the opinion of the 
Advocate General (AG) and the judgment of the ECJ from the perspec-
tive of this question (Part 11). Relevant to answering this question is an 
examination of several different issues. For example, what idea of 
'equality' does the judiciary apply in these texts, and what idea of time? 
What are the purposes of overtime supplements according to the AG and 
the ECJ? How is the 'procedure' of establishing indirect discrimination 
applied in this case? In the following part, I evaluate the Helmig case from 
the perspective of both a formal and a substantive approach to legal 
411 
Rikki Holtmaat 
equality (Part Ill). Although the judgment can be seen as a good example 
of a strictly formal approach, a closer look at the case reveals that the AG 
and the ECJ can be accused of having a quite peculiar idea of formal 
equality, using it as a device to pursue their own objectives. The judgment 
of the ECJ is also very disappointing from the perspective of a substan-
tive approach. The Court completely neglects the 'real conditions' of 
women's lives in today's Europe, which more or less compel them to take 
on part-time jobs and make it very hard for them to work the amount of 
hours necessary to 'earn' an overtime supplement (the 'normal' working 
week). It is my opinion, however, that the substantive approaches to legal 
sex-equality also fails to offer us the right 'tools' to overcome this 
problem. Both the formal and the substantive approaches to legal sex-
equality bring about a number of dangers that might in the end cause a 
serious backlash against more fundamen~al changes in gender relations. 
Three particular flaws of sex-equality law are discussed here: 
comparability, norm-conformity and lack of (feminist) legal theory 
(Part IV). I suggest that a more comprehensive approach, based on an 
analysis of the way in which gender operates in law, is necessary and 
should be developed in order to overcome these flaws. Thus, it is 
necessary to develop an analytic tool that is suitable to bring to the sur-
face what is at the root of the 'problem' of part-time workers (often seen 
as the problem of paid working women). This tool is the analytic category 
of gender, as has been developed in women's studies in other academic 
fields. In the final part of this paper (Part V), I will explore the possibilities 
this conception of gender has to offer to feminist legal studies. 
11. The Case of Angelika Helmig and 
Five Other German Women 
A. A Summary of the Facts of the Case 
Six German women brought cases to their national (regional) judge in 
which they claimed they had been (indirectly) discriminated against by 
their employers by the application of a collective agreement in which a 
surplus to the normal hourly wage was granted in the event that the worker 
had to work more than the normal working time (which was equated with 
the working time of a full-time employee). The consequence of this 
regulation in the collective agreement was that part-time workers only 
received this extra supplementary payment when they worked more then 
38 or 40 hours in a certain week (which was hardly ever the case). 
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The case illustrates a severe dispute over the concept of time, though 
the dispute is covered under a thick layer of legal equality talk which 
makes it quite hard to discover the 'true' nature of the conflict at stake. 
What the women in essence argued was that for them it was as 
'inconvenient' to work extra hours (that is hours beyond the agreed and 
fixed working time per week) as it was for full-time workers. Demanding 
that an employee work overtime (which, in most legal systems, an em-
ployer may do) interferes with what the worker has planned to do after 
working hours. This may be sleeping, swimming, watching T.V., or 
playiog with the kids (as most full-time male employees do after working 
hours),3 or it may be fulfilling other 'duties' in life, such as looking after 
sick parents, taking care of the house-work or caring for children. 
Individuals organize their lives 'around' working hours (which are very 
often fixed, though increasingly employers demand a great amount of 
'flexibility' from their employees) and any (unforeseen) change of 
working hours means that all kinds of arrangements have to be changed. 
It is this 'inconvenience' that these six women wanted to be compensated 
for in the form of overtime-supplements. 
Because the women (in fact their lawyers on their behalf) brought their 
case as a case of indirect sex-discrimination, (constituting a breach of the 
'principle' of equal pay, as laid down in article 119 of the Treaty) they 
had to formulate their view of the conflict in terms of the law (especially 
in terms of the case-law as developed by the ECJ). As I will show later on 
in this paper, this also meant that their argument was weaker; in other 
words, they took the sting out of their grievance against the employers by 
bringing a case of alleged (indirect) discrimination, as a result of which, 
they could not effectively bring forward the systemic nature of the 
disadvantage they suffered. How, in effect, was their complaint 
'translated' in order to make it 'fit' with the ECJ case law on indirect 
discrimination in equal pay matters?4 In essence, their lawyers and the 
German judges formulated three questions, which can be summarized as 
follows: 5 
1. Is there indirect discrimination of the kind prohibited by article 
119 of the Treaty and the directive where a collective agreement 
provides for overtime supplements only for the overtime worked 
in excess of the normal full-time working hours, with no 
supplements for overtime worked by part-time employees - who 
are primarily women- short of that threshold? 
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2. If so, is such discrimination justified on objective grounds 
unrelated to discrimination on the basis of sex in view of the fact 
that for full-time employees (i) the burden is greater and (ii) leisure 
time is restricted? 
3. If part-time employees are entitled to a supplement for each hour 
worked over the contractual hours, how should that supplement be 
calculated? 
As you can see, nowhere in these questions is the systemic nature of 
the 'disadvantage' of part-time working women mentioned; on the other 
hand, right from the beginning of the procedure, there is room for defence 
(from the employers): possible objective justifications they might have 
are mentioned in full! 6 
The European Commission supported the view of the six women, 
especially their point that there are no objective justifications for 
withholding the supplements from part-time workers, because there is no 
greater burden for full-timers. 7 Something of the 'original' conflict can 
be retraced in the way the Commission rejects the justifications that were 
brought forward by the employers. The UK intervened in the case, in 
strong support of the argument of the employers against granting overtime 
supplements to part-time workers. The position of the UK government 
reflects a purely economic view of the subject of (alleged) sex-
discrimination: if employers were to pay these supplements part-time 
work would become too costly, which - in the end - would be to the 
detriment of women, because they depend on the availability of part-time 
work more than men. (This is not the first instance in which women are 
advised not to bring a case of equal treatment 'for their own good'.) Now, 
let us see how the judiciary deals with these three questions. First, we 
will give the floor to the AG. 
B. The Rationale of the Advocate General 
I will not recapitulate the whole opinion of the AG here. Instead, I will 
draw your attention to some remarkable points in his reasoning in this 
case: 
'Equal or unequal, that is the question' 
The interesting part of the opinion begins at paragraph 26, where the 
AG starts to 'wonder' whether the claimants can seriously mean that they 
think the overtime hours of part-timers should be paid at the same rate as 
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over-time hours of full-timers. He describes their point (which he- in 
paragraph 27, in a very brief 'observation', summarizes as a 'puzzling 
statement') as follows: 
"To claim that exceeding the contractual hours of a part-time employee 
must systematically bring entitlement to the supplement is equivalent 
to saying that the employee whose contract stipulates that she must 
work five hours is entitled to the supplement from the sixth hour 
onward. Yet that hour is to be paid without a supplement not only to 
full-time workers but also to part-time workers whose contractual 
hours are more than five." (para. 26) 
What is very ingenious, I think, of the AG, is that he spreads the seed 
of doubt as to the 'rationality' of the equality-claim brought by the part-
time workers: how could they ever claim equality or equal treatment if 
this obviously would lead to the unequal treatment of other part-timers 
(those who agreed to work more then five hours in his example)? Here, it 
seems, the AG has a good point: if you claim equality you will (always) 
have to claim it for all; otherwise, it could not be 'rational'. For most 
individuals, who reason from a 'common sense knowledge' of equality 
(or who reason from a moral perspective on equality), this rings very 
'true'. The AG plays very effectively on these 'sentiments', though it has 
little to do with a legal approach to equality, independent of whether you 
are an proponent of formal or of substantive legal equality. In neither of 
these approaches is it proscribed that under no circumstances should there 
be inequality or unequal treatment. Even the formal approach leaves 
plenty of room for unequal treatment, as long as the cases are (deemed to 
be) unequal. 8 This refers to the second part of the classical Aristotelian 
formula, much used in legal equality theory, which states that unequal 
cases should be treated unequally in proportion to their inequality.9 The 
'irrationality' that the AG accuses the claimants of is thus only irrational 
if you deliberately want to overlook 'differences' between workers which 
may 'justify' a different treatment. In effect the AG here plays a formida-
ble trick, a card he plays again in paragraphs 29, 30 and 31. 
These paragraphs in the AG's opinion are even more revealing as to 
the objectives the AG seeks to reach in this case: what he wants to achieve 
is 'real' equality, which could never be achieved if the claimants won the 
case, as what the claimants (the women) want would, in effect, lead to a 
'real' inequality. The AG is quite open about this: 
415 
Rikki Holtmaat 
"The applicants in the main proceedings go further: for the uniform 
criterion of the weekly working hours fixed by statute or by cQ.llective 
agreement they seek to substitute a fluctuating one which would vary 
with the contractual hours and which, on the pretext of removing an 
assumed inequality of treatment, would in fact give rise to real 
inequality (my italics), because/or the same number of hours worked 
(original italics), some workers would be paid the supplement and 
others not." (para. 29)10 
After having stated (in paragraph 30) that from other case-law of the 
ECJ, 11 it follows that part-time workers are subject to the same rules as 
others, but in proportion to their working hours (original italics) the AG 
goes on to stress again that inequality would be the result of granting the 
claimants what they want: 
"There would be unequal treatment conferring an advantage on part-
time employees, however, of a significance inversely proportional to 
the length of their contractual working hours if the supplements were 
payable as soon· as those hours were exceeded." (para. 31) 
·It is evident that the AG expends much effort to show that part-timers 
might be advantaged by applying the norm of legal equality, while, at the 
same time, he does everything to cover the fact that at this moment (the 
status quo) full-timers are advantaged and part-timers are disadvantaged. 
Will part-timers ever be able to 'earn' the supplements? To do so they 
would have to put in a far greater 'effort' (exceeding their normal working 
hours to a far greater extent) than full-timers. 
On second thoughts, it is also disputable what the idea (or principle) 
of proportionality (the Kowalska rule) really entails. One question is 
particularly important: in proportion to what should the rights of part-
timers be established? It is evident that here the (male) norm of full-time 
work is re-established: every right a part-timer has should be measured 
against the (established) rights of full-timers. It can never be the other 
way around! 
The purpose of overtime-supplements 
The next point I want you to have a closer look at is the way in which 
AG Darmon stipulates an a priori, which is only 'true' from a truly 'male' 
perspective on the issue of time. In paragraph 28, he reasons as follows: 
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"The purpose of the overtime supplements is to recompense the extra 
effort contributed by the employee and to dissuade employers from 
making staff work longer hours than those fixed by the collective 
agreement, so that, a priori, it would seem to have little relevance to 
part-time work." (my italics) 
It is always very difficult to establish a certain purpose of a measure 
or legal rule as the purpose. Even if the rule is announced by a formal 
legislator, who has left written proceedings of the process in which the 
rule was 'born', you will almost never find 'a' or 'the' purpose of the rule 
in question, because most rules or regulations in democratic countries 
come to life after a long process of bargaining (between the parties 
involved who have conflicting interests in the case) and, in the end, are 
the result of a complicated process of compromise-making. Rules on 
overtime-supplements that are laid down in collective agreements are not 
officially ordained by a certain legislator at a certain time with a certain 
purpose, but - on the contrary - they are the result of a historical process 
of shifting alliances between employers and employees and of shifting 
meanings. So an experienced and learned lawyer like AG Darmon should 
know better than to speak of the purpose of the payment of overtime 
supplements. Anyhow, perhaps for the 'traditional' employee (often male) 
the historical purpose of bargaining for these supplements might have 
been - as the AG states - to recompense the extra effort. 12 Still, the a 
priori that follows this statement on the alleged purposes, 'colours' the 
meaning of extra effort very specifically: an effort is only 'extra', and 
worth extra payment (I) when it exceeds the normal working week (which 
is the working week of a full-time employee). 
The second purpose mentioned is equally flawed. Employers should 
be discouraged from requiring employees to work longer hours than 
the 38 or 40 hours that are fixed in the collective agreements. Why is that? 
The only 'explanation' for this 'protection' that I can think of is that the 
working week of the 'normal' worker has been taken to be the 'utmost' a 
person could 'offer' to his/her employer; exceeding this amount would 
'over-stress' the worker too often. In his a priori conclusion, the AG 
presumes that part-timers will not be over-s~ressed as long as they are not 
asked to work more then 38 or 40 hours a week. This only holds true if 
you presuppose that the worker who works part-time has more leisure 
time then the full-time worker, so 'stress' will not occur if a boss asks 
him or her to work a few hours more than has contractually been agreed 
to. We all know the reasons why most individuals who work part-time do 
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this: it is not in order to have more leisure-time, it is in order to have 
more time to fulfil other tasks or duties, such as unpaid care activities. 
This information, however, has not yet reached the AG! 
The concept of time 
Two more statements of the AG are revealing. In the first place, I would 
like to draw your attention to paragraph 39, in which the AG explicitly 
affirms the 'norm' that time is divided into working time and leisure time. 
Again, it is useful to quote the AG in full: 
"Similarly, the additional fatigue and the reduction in leisure-time 
caused by working overtime in addition to the ordinary working week 
constitute objective reasons which may justify the exclusion by a col-
lective agreement of part-time employees from supplements where the 
overtime they work does not exceed those hours." (para. 39) 13 
Time is represented here as a dual 'entity' which contains two distinc-
tive types of activity: there is working time and there is leisure time. There 
appears to be nothing else. Only when a full-time worker exceeds the 
normal working time does the additional fatigue and restriction of leisure-
time justify overtime payments. The AG does not seem to realize that 
other activities (such as care work) might also put a claim on the total 
amount of time a person can spend in a day. As far as these activities are 
recognized at all, they are discarded as 'educational commitments' (pa-
ras 40 and 41.) The fact that these commitments exist do - in the eyes of 
the AG - not offer a possible justification for overtime payments. They 
seem not to contribute to the fatigue of the worker and the reduction of 
his or her leisure time. The potential conflicting interests of workers and 
employers as to the question of how much time can or has to be spent on 
different types of human activities appears to be a conflict between work 
and leisure only. In reality, however, for most part-time workers (mostly 
women) the main conflict lies between different and conflicting time-
demands that follow from paid work and from care work. Work-time 
patterns often do not coincide with care-time patterns, the first being of a 
linear nature, the second of a cyclical nature. 14 Compensation for the loss 
of care-time - caused by the employers demand to work overtime - is a 
justification of overtime-payments for part-timers that is seriously 
overlooked by the AG. 
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The separation of public and private life 
It is interesting to see how this omission· is legally constructed in the 
opinion of AG Darmon. In paragraph 40 and 41, the AG mentions the so-
called 'educational commitments' of part-timers. The plea of the claimants 
that they should be paid overtime supplements because it is not leisure-
time but time to be spent on unpaid care that is taken away by the em-
ployer is brought back by Darmon to the single phrase 'educational 
commitments'. This is all the AG has to say about the argument. The fact 
that these commitments exist does not deliver an objectively justified 
reason for a different treatment of part-timers (in the sense that their 
hourly wage will sometimes be higher). In paragraph 42, the AG repeats 
his worry that part-timers might have an advantage. Again, he denies them 
the 'favour', stating that full-timers may have the same educational 
commitments, thereby denying the right to the 'extra' benefit to part-
timers. In the end, the argument of the claimants is disregarded with the 
help of the notorious Bilka-formula on the (limited) impact of EC-
Equality Law on the relationships between the partners in organizing their 
household: 15 
"Article 119 does not have the effect of requiring an employer to 
organize its occupational pension scheme in such a manner as to take 
into account the particular difficulties faced by persons with family 
responsibilities in meeting the conditions for entitlement to such 
pension." 
With this formula a strong wall has been built between the sphere of 
employment (covered by the directives and art. 119) and the sphere of 
'private life' (the way couples organize their family-work). It is exactly 
this wall that prevents AG Darmon (and the Court) from seeing behind 
the 'normality' of the working conditions of full-timers, which normality 
keeps women from gaining 'true' equality both in the sphere of paid work 
and in the sphere of unpaid work. 
C. The Judgment of the Court 
Compared to the opinion of the AG, the judgment of the ECJ is even 
terser. In a 'staccato' of brief statements, the Court 'runs' to the conclu-
sion that in their case there is no forbidden (indirect) sex-discrimination. 
The ECJ begins by saying that it must consider whether the contested 
provisions may constitute indirect discrimination incompatible with arti-
cle 119 of the Treaty (Para. 22). It then goes on to state that to that end 
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two separate questions need to be answered. (I go into this detail because 
this 'legal technique' causes the misfortune of our six brave German 
women, fighting for their 'right'.) First, according to the ECJ, we must 
see whether there is a case of different treatment. If so, then we can move 
on to the question of whether women suffer more from this different 
treatment, so that there might be a case of indirect sex-discrimination 
(Para. 23). 16 
To my knowledge, it is the first time the ECJ has applied this double 
test at the beginning of a case of (alleged) indirect discrimination. 17 In 
earlier cases, as well as in the proposed EC-Directive on the shifting of 
the burden of proof, in which a 'definition' of indirect discrimination is 
given, there is only one question that should be asked (and answered by 
the claimant) and that is whether the rule or practice in question dispro-
portionately disadvantages the members of one sex. 18 The separation of 
this one question into a set of two separate questions offers the ECJ the 
verdict in this case. Instead of asking whether the claimants (with the help 
of statistical evidence) have established the fact that predominantly 
women are suffering from the negative effects of the contested rules about 
payments for overtime-supplements, the ECJ now first wants to establish 
whether there is a difference in treatment of the two parties involved (part-
timers and full-timers). The end of the story then comes very quickly: no, 
says the Court, we do not see any difference in treatment, so there is no 
case of indirect discrimination (Paras 26-30). Like the AG, the ECJ is 
making a 'comparison' that has the appearance of utmost 'objectivity' .19 
Every single hour a worker gets paid for should be paid for in the same 
way as any other hour worked by any other worker. So the 19th hour of 
a worker who contractually has to work 18 hours should be paid the same 
as the 19th hour of a worker who contractually has to work 40 hours. 
Otherwise, the full-timer worker could claim to be discriminated against! 
This 'logic', based on a presumed identity or sameness of hours, 
irrespective of the conditions under which they are worked, leads the ECJ 
to the final conclusion that the six women had no case they could win 
under article 119 of the Treaty. Thus, the ECJ, by what has the appearance 
of a correct application of a 'purely' formal type of reasoning,20 protects 
full-timers from 'unfair' unequal payment21 and assimilates part-timers 
to the norm of full-time employment. Here you can see how, through a 
certain legal 'device', protection of the most powerful and assimilation 
of the least powerful go hand in hand. 
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What I said before about the appearance of a correct application of 
formal legal equality needs further explanation. I will come to that in the 
next part of this paper, in which I evaluate the Helmig judgment from the 
perspective of both formal and substantive equality. 
Ill. Formal and Substantive Equality 
There are two points I want to discuss here: first, can this judgment be 
seen as a (correct form of a) formal approach by the ECJ?; secondly, what 
might the outcome have been if the ECJ had taken a (more) substantive 
approach? 
A. Formal Equality 
A 'true' understanding of the meaning of legal equality always entails 
the understanding of the normative character of that concept.22 Equality 
in the sense of sameness or identity can - except for the abstract world of 
mathematics - never be found in the 'real' world. So, in order to apply 
the already mentioned Aristotelian formula, the legislator or the judge 
must establish on a case by case basis what persons or what situations are 
considered to be (un)equal for the purpose of the rule or regulation in 
question. In this way to decide or choose what is equal and what is 
different is a relative matter, that is, relative to the ends or purposes of 
the legal rule or practice. What should be kept in mind is that law-making 
is a constant process of classification, in which the law(yer) differentiates 
between individuals and groups that do- and those that do not- fall under 
a rule. In order to ban discrimination in society, a vast number of countries 
have accepted rules that put a 'ban' on certain classifications, like classi-
fications on the basis of race, religion, ethnic origin or sex. If a citizen or 
a law(yer) wants to classify along those lines, this is strictly forbidden or 
strictly scrutinized. In these instances, the problem as to which cases are 
to be treated alike has been solved once and for all: individuals of different 
race, sex, religion, political parties or ethnical origin are equal before the 
law. From this, it follows that direct discrimination on the basis of sex, 
etc., is forbidden (non-justifiable) unless the law itself makes certain ex-
1 . h. 23 c ustons to t ts norm. 
In the case of Angelika Helmig and the five other German women- a 
case of alleged indirect discrimination - the judge did not have such a 
stronghold. Whether a case of unequal treatment of part-timers occurs and 
whether this unequal treatment amounts to discrimination on the basis of 
sex, depends on a number of choices the judge makes, which - in order 
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to be 'rational' -must be related to the purposes of the contested rule or 
practice. What I have said above (section II.B) about the (false) analysis 
the AG makes of the purpose of overtime-supplements is particularly re-
levant with respect to this observation of how formal legal equality 
'works': if one of the parties (deliberately or not) brings forward a purpose 
or purposes that are not (fully) 'true', the choice of what is deemed to be 
(un)equal subsequently lacks a firm basis and becomes arbitrary. 
On both points (the choice and the purpose(s)), both the AG and the 
ECJ, though apparently 'neutral' and 'objective', are operating in a 
dubious way. About the purposes I have said enough, about the choice I 
want to make one more (final) point: both the AG and the ECJ assume 
that they can compare and assimilate (like a=a in mathematics) one hour 
worked by a part-timer to one hour worked by a full-timer. This is only 
possible if you have a very limited idea of time. That this is the case is 
most apparent in the opinion of the AG (see my remarks on paragraph 39). 
The normative concept of time that they apply causes an apparently cor-
rect application of the principle of formal equality. If they had applied 
another normative concept of time, it could have resulted in a different 
choice as to the question of what they considered to be (un)equal in that 
respect. This leaves us with the conclusion that both the AG and the Court 
could have come to an altogether different conclusions, still applying the 
rules of formal legal equality 'correctly'. 
To summarise: formal legal equality does not tell us anything about a 
possible outcome of a case, it only tells us something about the procedure 
towards equality: a rational choice as to who or what is considered to be 
(un)equal should be made on the basis of a correct analysis of the 
purposes of the rule that is/has to be applied. Any choice that does not 
fulfil this condition leads to arbitrariness and thus can never be said to 
lead to equality at all. 
It is impossible here to go into the reasons why the ECJ takes this 
formal stance in the Helmig case. In a very recent article, Fenwick and 
Hervey present a convincing theory about the limitations of EC-equality 
law as far as a more substantive approach is concerned.24 It is their opi-
nion that the ECJ does not have the courage to step over the limits that 
economic or market values lay down. In other words, the ECJ does not 
really make a choice between the free market and equality. In the last 
paragraph of their article, they phrase this problem as follows: 
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"[ ... ]the concept of sex-discrimination in EC law is premised upon a 
particular market-related philosophy; thus furtherance of equality in 
the context of market forces creates a contradiction which can be 
evaded for a time but which eventually has to be addressed. In 
addressing it, a choice will tend to arise between formal and substan-
tive equality. To choose substantive equality may be to create a more 
severe disruption of 'natural' market forces and the Court seems to be 
indicating its reluctance to make such a choice."25 
The reluctance of the ECJ to go further on the route towards substan-
tive equality can be seen as a reluctance not only to contravene economic 
forces, but also strong societal forces, such as the existing gendered pat-
terns of life, in which both work in the labour market and work in the 
home have their own 'valuation'. As one of my students observed: 
"To recognize the right of part-time workers to supplementary 
overtime pay would be to strike a blow at the established structure of 
the workplace, would shake the foundation of the male 'gendered' 
system and would introduce[ ... ] for the first time a recognition of the 
double burden borne by women and the reasons why they feel forced 
to take part-time work."26 
This leaves us with the question why the Court is so reluctant to go 
against those economic and social forces and whether, by applying a 
(more) substantive approach to equality, it really could have reached this 
'recognition'. 
B. Substantive Equality 
Among feminist legal scholars who are active in the field of EC sex-
equality law, it is rather 'common' to be in favour of a (more) substantive 
approach to equality. I do not belong to this group. That is not to say that 
I would not favour a (more) substantive approach by the ECJ (or by 
legislators at EC and at national level), but it is to say that I am not as 
optimistic about the possible results of this approach as many of my 
colleagues are. Both the concept of indirect discrimination and the con-
cept of positive action are seen as signals that EC Equality Law leaves 
room for a (more) substantive approach to equality. This, however, should 
not lead us to think that the substantive approach to equality is nothing 
more (or less) than applying the concept of indirect discrimination and 
developing (and justifying) positive action programmes.27 
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This paper is not the right place to explain in full detail what is meant 
when lawyers develop a plea for substantive equality. In short, one could 
say that this approach adds one essentially important feature to the two 
features of legal equality that appeared in my analysis of formal legal 
equality (choice and purpose). Where the formal approach stays 
procedural, in the sense that it only tells us (us lawyers) to make rational 
choices on the basis of a proper evaluation of the purposes involved, the 
substantive approach also tells us a lot about what choices should be made 
as to who or what is to be treated (un)equally and- this is an important 
addition28 - what the nature of the (different) treatment should be (how 
one is to be treated in order to achieve equality). The basis on which these 
choices can (and should!) be made is that of the evaluation and valuation 
of social, economic and cultural conditions in which a given rule/practice 
operates or has to operate. So one could say that the substantive approach 
adds the notion of effect to the notions already mentioned.29 By this is 
meant that in order to bring about 'true' equality' each and every 
(contested) legal rule or social practice should be evaluated in terms of 
the effect it has on the (un)equal relations between the sexes. What these 
effects are or will be is measured against the context in which the rule is 
applied or in which the practice occurs. In this sense, the substantive 
approach is also called (by some) a contextual approach. It is clear that 
applying formal legal equality is a normative matter, however, it is also 
clear that applying substantive equality is an even more normative activity. 
In order to give a brief insight into the political-philosophical back-
ground of the debate between adherents of formal and substantive 
equality, I will, in a very simplified way, describe the most essential 
presuppositions of both approaches. 30 
The crucial 'division' runs along the following two lines, from which 
the first (A) has a political-philosophical nature and the second (B) has 
more of a legal nature. 
A 1: Do you perceive the function of the principle of legal (constitutio-
nally guaranteed) equality as a shield against the State or against other 
citizens (liberal idea of constitutional rights as constituting negative obli-
gations for the State); or 
A 2: do you perceive the function of the principle of legal (constitutionally 
guaranteed) equality as a vehicle to bring about more 'real' equality in 
social, economic, cultural life (social idea of constitutional rights as 
constituting positive obligations for the State)? 
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B 1: Do you stress that the role of law does not go further than to establish 
the necessity of procedural devices that will prevent governments (or 
others in power) from arbitrariness (and subsequent unfairness); or 
B 2: do you (also) stress that law(yers) should constantly be evaluating 
the results in practice of any ('neutral') rule that will occur under the given 
social conditions (which are unequal!) in order to help bring about more 
'true' equality? 
With the risk of offending some of the participants in the debate 
(individual scholars never like to be classified!) I would say that the 
formal approach has characteristics A 1 and B 1, and that the substantive 
approach is correctly typified by A2 and B2. 
At this point, I would like to go back to the question of why the ECJ is 
reluctant to embrace a (more) substantive approach to equality. Apart from 
economic and societal 'forces' (discussed above), I think there is more to 
it than that. If you have a closer look at the presuppositions (A2 and B2) 
as I described them, you will realize that embracing the concept of subs-
tantive equality presupposes deeply held 'beliefs' in the political and 
moral values of a social welfare state, in which the role of law is a pro-
gressive one, steering and engineering social change on the basis of dis-
tributive justice. I think that this opinion is not to be expected from most 
lawyers in the near future, especially not from judges! Instead, judges are 
better situated in the liberal political and restrictive legal tradition that 
fits perfectly with the model of formal legal equality.31 
Would the outcome of the case of Angelika Helmig have been very 
different if the Court had been ready to apply a (more) substantive 
approach, in particular by fully applying the test for indirect discrimina-
tion (known as the Bilka test)?32 I seriously doubt that it would. We all 
know from the many indirect discrimination cases the ECJ has dealt with 
that the outcome of the Bilka test is very uncertain. Much depends on the 
way the ECJ perceives (wants to perceive) the 'facts' of the case.33 In a 
long series of very detailed articles and in several voluminous books on 
the subject of how the ECJ deals with cases of indirect discrimination34, 
it has been made clear by feminist lawyers and feminist legal scholars 
that the ECJ does not go very far in this respect. Particularly, the objec-
tive justification test, which forms a hard core of the concept of indirect 
discrimination, leaves a lot of room for defendants (employers) to bring 
forward circumstances (even economic circumstances) that will - in the 
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eyes of the judges- justify the disproportional negative impact women 
suffer from applying (so called) neutral rules or practices.35 
What is most important to realize is that in the substantive approach 
even more normative evaluations are required than is already the case in 
the formal approach. On the one hand, this is a favourable condition for 
women who want to bring their claim: they can thus bring forward the 
circumstances (or context) and establish that the effect of the rule or 
practice is that they are 'disadvantaged' (I will come back to that term). 
In this sense, one could say that the substantive approach opens up 
possibilities for women ·'to tell their stories' .36 But the negative side of 
this is that it leaves the judiciary more space to be normative in their own 
way. As we have clearly seen in the analysis of the AG and the ECJ in the 
Helmig case, very often those normative choices are presented as objec-
tive 'truths', which disregard the context that has been brought forward 
by the claimants. In the Helmig case, as we have seen, the women's claim 
that they were working a double shift, was reduced- only by the AG, the 
ECJ did not even mention a word on it - to two words: educational 
commitments. Of course, it would have been wonderful if the ECJ had 
taken the women's claim more seriously and had taken the context into 
account. That could have meant that the ECJ would have come to another 
conclusion as to the question of whether you can consider the 19th hour 
of a part-time working women to be the same as the 19th hour of a full-
time working man. But you can never be sure that with this the final result 
would have been different. In this case, the Court could still have 
concluded that the employers' 'story' offered sufficient objective justifi-
cation for the difference in treatment. (AG Darmon concluded that this 
actually was the case.) This means that there is no guarantee whatsoever 
that had the Court taken the substantive approach, the outcome would 
have been one bit more favourable for the women involved in the case. 
So making legal proceedings more, rather than less, normative does 
not automatically mean you will get a 'better' (or more 'equal') outcome. 
Whether this happens or not depends to a great extent on the power that 
the involved parties (claimants, defendants, lawyers and the judges) have 
in defining what is relevant in this specific legal case. As I have shown in 
my analysis of Helmig the matter of legal relevancy is determined by two 
major factors: (1) the way a concept is defined (see section II.A, in which 
I showed that the women had to phrase their 'problem' in terms of the 
concept of indirect sex-discrimination) and (2) the way a procedure is 
established (illustrated by the effect of the fact that the Court suddenly 
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separated a certain question into two different requirements that had to 
be fulfilled; see section II.C.). On both points, it is important to influence 
the judicial process. However, it is questionable whether it is possible to 
have this influence without possessing 'the power of definition' .37 
My findings, concerning the possibilities of both the formal and the 
substantive approach, are quite negative. Nevertheless, I certainly see the 
necessity of a choice for the substantive approach if you want to proceed 
towards more just and better (in the sense of advancing 'the good life') 
social relations between individuals with the help of the claim for (more) 
legal equality or equal rights. 
IV. Why Sex Equality Law is Dangerous 
In this part of this paper, I want to discuss the issue of the limited 
possibilities of legal sex-equality. This is not a complete inventory of all 
the pitfalls one might encounter when attempting a strategy of legal 
equality.38 Instead, I have chosen to concentrate on three main issues. In 
my 'critique', I will stay close to the example of the Helmig case, in order 
to avoid a merely abstract and theoretical position in the debate. 
A. Comparability 
In the vast literature on sex-equality and on the ECJ's equality-cases, 
much has already been said about the problems you will always encounter 
in relation to the comparison issue. That is to say, in order to apply (formal 
or substantive) legal equality one should establish that some individual 
or some group of individuals compared to another individual or group of 
individual is worse off or better off. This leaves you with the crucial 
problem of the standard of comparison.39 Though most writers on subs-
tantive equality are aware of the fact that the standard usually is a male 
standard (which can also be illustrated by the AG's comparison of hours 
in Helmig!), they nevertheless believe that their emphasis on effect and 
context will correct that problem. I do not think that this is the case. As 
the opinion of the European Commission in the H elmig case shows us 
(see section II.A.), comparability is also an essential feature of the subs-
tantive approach. In casu, the Commission thought the situation of part-
timers could be compared to that of full-timers. In that comparison, as in 
all comparisons in legal equality cases, the last situation constituted the 
dominant norm: the norm that could or could not be applied to the 'other' 
group. So what happens is that this specific norm is not problematized. 40 
A working week of 38 or 40 hours is considered to be normal. What legal 
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equality- almost by definition- fails to do is to problematize normalities, 
which are exactly the normalities that constitute the so-called systemic 
disadvantage or institutional discrimination of women.41 Comparison to 
the dominant norm in this way comes down to assimilation to that nmm. 
For, in effect, what the adherents of a substantive approach would have 
wished to happen is that the ECJ would have deemed the situation of the 
part-time worker to be comparable- in the sense of fit to be equated-
with that of the full-time worker. This presupposes that sameness or 
identity is a pre-condition for equality or equal treatment. With that, 
difference is- again- subordinated to equality.42 
B. Norm-conformity 
In the second place, there is the already mentioned danger of 
conformity to the established social norms and practices, including 
gendered practices. This danger does not only occur if you apply formal 
equality (though it then is more evident), it occurs as well within a subs-
tantive approach. Norm-conformity does not only come about through the 
mechanism of comparison of cases (as discussed above), but also as a 
result of gender stereotypes that lie at the basis of the description of the 
'real lives of women' (as used in substantive theories). If the Court in the 
Helmig case had taken the context of part-time working women into 
account, it would have had to do so on the basis of a broad generalization 
of the double burden borne by working women. In doing so, it could easily 
have re-established the 'norm' that all women always do all the housework 
and that's why they all are said to be 'forced' to take on part-time work, 
and overlook other 'facts', such as the fact that research shows that young 
people have different work ethics and make different life-choices on that 
basis. Part-time work (at least in Holland) is no longer a 'women's solu-
tion' to 'women's problems'. Many young people work part-time from 
free choice (because they have a different ethic of work) or do so because 
there is no full-time work available at the labour market. In other words, 
when the problem of the disadvantage of part-time workers is defined as 
a problem of women, a) a stereotyped picture of women's labour is 
reaffirmed, and b) social reality is, in part, neglected. 
As far as point a) is concerned: substantive equality theory thus 
contributes to the preservation of existing representations of 'working 
women' that are based on the existing (unequal) power-relations between 
the sexes. This point is best illustrated by the fact that in a lot of writing 
on substantive equality the writers use terms such as 'the real lives of 
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women' whenever they refer to the so-called context that should be taken 
into account.43 In other words, the context of the case -including 
gendered patterns of behaviour of men and women - is accepted as a pre-
given (and, as such, not to be changed or changeable) 'fact' .44 
By equating the category of the part-time worker with the category 
'working women' (which is a gendered category), one pursues a 
dangerous strategy in which a (presumed) social reality (the statistical 
evidence that more women then men engage in part-time work) is 
transferred into a sexualized or gendered category. By this, I mean (as I 
will explain further in part 5 of this paper) a category that is a 'constitu-
tive element of social relationships based on perceived differences 
between the sexes and . . . a primary way of signifying relationships of 
power' .45 Neither formal nor substantive legal equality can escape from 
this 'trap'. The judicial process in which sex-equality law is applied for-
ces us into the use of dichotomies in which pairs of fixed categories 
always have to be compared (see above) in order to make it possible for 
the legislator and the judges to make their choices as to who or what is to 
be given the same or equal right.46 In the end, the legal process simply 
aims at saying a categorical YES or a categorical NO to any rights-claim 
that is brought to it. This process forces you into stereotyping and 
generalizing. So, in our case, Angelika Helmig (and her representatives) 
were forced to present their problem (which they felt to be an injustice), 
namely the fact that part-timers did not get the overtime supplements, as 
a claim of sex-discrimination, which, in turn, forced them to categorize 
part-time work as women's work. If they had taken a more nuanced 
stance, they probably would not even have had the opportunity to bring 
the claim at all.47 
If there is any escape from this, it must lie in the element of purpose 
that is of eminent importance in both legal equality approaches. As I 
explained above, the choice as to what or who is (un)equal must be based 
on purpose, and - in turn - the choice of the relevant purpose is a key 
point in the whole process of establishing or granting legal (in)equality. 
This means that in sex-equality cases, the alleged or even established 
purpose of the rule or practice involved is just as important as its context 
or effect. It is my opinion that, in substantive equality theory, the accent 
lies too much on effect and context and not enough attention is paid to 
the element of (contested) purposes of rules. In discussing purposes, a 
shift of meaning and a shift of power should, and perhaps could, take 
place that could be favourable for the condition of women. 
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In the Helmig case the (alleged) purpose of overtime payments plays a 
crucial role. What should have been tried was to bring about a shift in the 
presumably fixed purposes of overtime payments. 48 Instead of the extra 
effort for employees working 38 or 40 hours per week (which implicitly 
is fixed as the most an employer can ask from a worker), one should have 
tried to get another purpose to be recognized: the purpose of freeing 
workers from serious inroads on their daily or weekly time-organization 
(which includes work-time, leisure-time, time to spend with relatives, time 
to care, time just to be there, etc.). A 'modern' (de-gendered) purpose of 
extra payments for working overtime can be said to be the balancing of 
the power of the employers (who may ask you to work overtime) and the 
employees (who may ask for the extra money in order to compensate for 
the inconvenience). Bringing forward such a purpose would have 
contested the dominance of the existing dual model of time, as consisting 
of work-time and leisure-time, the model of time that (in our world) has 
power over our lives in many respects. 
C. The Lack of Theory 
The third problem of legal equality theory and strategy involves the 
use of the 'concept' of disadvantage by feminist lawyers who favour the 
substantive equality approach. The use of this term is directly related to 
the doctrine of indirect discrimination, in which it has to be established 
that women suffer disproportionately from certain rules, or that women 
are 'systematically disadvantaged' by them. With this term, one can 
pretend to touch upon the level of what is sometimes called structural or 
systemic discrimination.49 By this, it is meant that sex-equality law should 
not only tackle overt forms of discrimination (whether direct or indirect), 5° 
but also gendered patterns of life that are deeply rooted (and hidden) in 
structural features of our societies. As such, the whole structure of la-
bour-relations, in which a divisions exists (or seems to exist) between the 
public and the private, is often mentioned as an example of such systemic 
discrimination. Another example is the existing pay structure (in which 
gender-biased systems of valuation of work are used) which is the hidden 
cause of pay inequalities. 5 1 
Defendants of a substantive approach are quite optimistic about the 
potentialities of the concept in reaching this 'level' of discrimination. 
Fen wick and Hervey, for example, in a review of the Enderby case, 52 state 
that, though the judgment of the ECJ is, in some respects, seriously 
flawed, this case gives us an example of the more far-reaching potential 
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of substantive equality. According to them, the Court here accepts the 
substantive approach and thereby contravenes the tendency of national 
courts to neglect ' [ ... ] a conceptual approach, including consideration of 
the underlying causes of the discriminatory effect' .53 Some writers are 
more realistic in this respect. Illustrative is the following remark by Titia 
Loenen: 
''As the Bilka and Rinner cases show, the fact that the measures at is-
sue affect many more women than men in a negative way makes the 
exclusion of part-timers from certain benefits 'suspect', but it does not 
resolve the problem of the unequal division of paid work and care."54 
From this, she concludes that it is the task of the legislator, not the 
judge, to tackle systemic discrimination. 
In my view, the use of the concept of disadvantage does little more 
than to reveal that, besides direct and indirect discrimination, another 
'level' of discrimination can be discerned. It does not help to make a start 
in abolishing (with the help of law) this type of discrimination. On the 
other hand, the use of the concept of disadvantage might help to sustain 
a certain type of legal reasoning, which closely fits the concept of legal 
equality as such (and that is why it has rooted quite easily, I think, into 
legal discourse on equality!). Disadvantage is completely concurrent with 
equality-talk because it contains in itself a notion of comparison, which, 
as you might remember from my discussion of the subject of formal legal 
equality, is one of the keys to an understanding of how legal equality 
works. Each and every case in which the (non-)equality of (groups of) 
persons or cases is contested contains an evaluation of whether the two 
(groups of) persons or the two cases are comparable in the light of the 
purpose (formal) and/or in the light of the context (substantive). The con-
cept of disadvantage, in other words, fits perfectly into the sameness/ 
difference test that each equality case always entails. As such, it reaffirms 
the (presumed) usefulness of that method. In itself, however, this does 
not explain why I have serious objections to the use of this concept. 
The main problem I have with the use of the concept of disadvantage 
is that it covers the fact that in legal equality theory very often nothing is 
said as to the nature or causes of women's societal, economical, cultural, 
legal, etc., inequality. By speaking about disadvantage, though it is 
suggested that we know where inequality stems from, nothing is in fact 
explained about the actual causes of the inequality between the two 
genders. The point that I want to make here is that it is dangerous not to 
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be explicit about the 'theory' of the nature or causes of women's 
'disadvantage'. Such a theoretical silence (or omission) can cause you to 
suggest 'solutions' that are not in the least adequate, or are even 
detrimental to women.55 1t can also cause feminist legal scholars to adhere 
to one or the other theory in a nai've way. So, for example, in articles on 
EC sex-equality law, many references can be found to the work of 
Catherine MacKinnon.56 Catherine MacKinnon's theory on the nature of 
sex-discrimination, however, may be qualified as an 'essentialistic 
theory' ,57 in which, in the end, both the fixed category of the male 
(subjugator) and the female (oppressed) are firmly re-established. In her 
work, MacKinnon does not refer to such things as systemic or institutional 
disadvantages of women, but instead she fixates solely on (different) male 
and female sexuality as being the sole cause of all oppression of women. 51! 
I wonder what one can do with this in the context of EC sex-equality case 
law! My conclusion is that, at best, in 'theorizing' about substantive sex-
equality, the use of the concept of disadvantage serves to cover up this 
lack of theory. 
D. Conclusion 
The three points of critique I developed in this part of the paper can be 
summarized in the sense that my main concern about legal sex-equality 
and the way it is (and will be) applied by the judiciary, as well as by 
feminist lawyers and legal theorists, is the fact that the categories of men 
(male) and women (female) hardly ever are problematized as such. On 
the contrary, they are constantly used in a non-critical way, thus 
reproducing the normative discourse on maleness and femaleness through 
the legal forum. Substantive equality theorists often refer to such 'facts' 
as 'the real lives of women', thereby not only reproducing these 'facts' 
but, at the same time, reproducing the category of women as a fixed 
category. 
In law, as in many academic disciplines, the concept of gender is very 
often used as a substitute for the biological (and sexually defined) 
categories of male and female. If you want to establish (indirect) discri-
mination, you just start counting and comparing numbers: if more females 
are negatively affected, the measurement can be discriminatory against 
females. Apart from the fact that this is a very limited approach to gender 
(I will return to that below), it is also evident that, in this way, you keep 
repeating that men and women are different (can and must be counted as 
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different categories!). It is highly questionable whether this does not do 
more harm than good! 
It is time to turn to the last question which I want to address in this 
paper: what theory on the nature of inequality of women do I adhere to 
and what notion or concept of gender fits into this theory. 
V. Towards a Gender Analysis of Law 
In this final part of the paper, I will present a brief introduction to the 
theoretical notions (or theory) on gender that I have used in order to 
analyze the Helmig case and the concept of sex-equality in EC Law as I 
have just done in the previous paragraphs. 
In paragraph IV.B above I cited Joan W. Scott and the reference where 
she gives a definition of gender. Her analysis has been very useful to me, 
though it is developed within the academic discipline of history and, as 
such, is not in all respects applicable to legal theory. As I know that her 
work is not at all well known among (feminist) legal scholars, I will 
summarize some of her points that seem useful for the development of a 
more encompassing understanding of how gender operates in law. 59 
A. What Gender Theory is (not) About 
In her article Gender A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, Joan 
Scott distinguishes between two important ways in which the concept of 
gender has a function in theory: it can be merely a way to describe the 
position of women (in relation to that of men) or it can pretend to offer 
causal explanations about the nature of the oppression of women. I think 
in legal theory, as far as gender is used at all, it is mostly done so in a 
descriptive way. In this sense, substantive equality theorists sometimes 
use gender when they describe the context of a rule or practice that cau-
ses women's 'disadvantage', which is so important in their theory. 
It is important to concentrate on the way gender can function in theories 
that pretend to explain the 'nature' or 'ultimate causes' of the persistent 
(social, economic, cultural, sexual, etc.) inequality of women. As I said 
above (section IV.C.), I think feminist legal theory cannot do without such 
a 'grounding' theory. 60 The need for theory has been expressed by Scott 
in the following statement: you need theory because you need a 
'synthesizing perspective that can explain continuities and discontinuities 
and can account for persisting inequalities as well as radically different 
social experiences.' 61 She also points to the discrepancy between the high 
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quality results of women's studies and their continuing marginal status in 
the academic world, arguing that this demonstrates the limits of descrip-
tive approaches that do not address dominant disciplinary concepts. 
In her article on the deconstruction of the equality-versus-difference 
debate, Scott proposes that a theory on gender that might be useful in 
changing or abolishing gender-inequalities should contain two 
characteristics. The first is that it should contain a possibility for 
systematic critical analysis of the way categorical 'differences' work in a 
process of continuous inclusion and exclusion (of men and women). The 
second is that this theory should reject any idea of equality as a 'truth' 
that denies the existence of differences, but instead should contain a re-
cognition of differences as inherently valuable. 62 
As for the way gender is used in causal theories on the nature of 
women's oppression, Scott rejects all theories that are in any way 
essentialist. For a historian this makes extra sense: if women's inequality 
has to be explained on the basis of women's (biologically determined) 
nature, there exists little room for a historical analysis of gender, it being 
essentially the same category during the whole of human history. In this 
case, it is fixed for ever what in essence men and women are. Fundamental 
change (both in history and in the future), is excluded in such an approach. 
For a lawyer, the rejection of essentialism does not flow directly from the 
nature of the subject studied. 63 Whether law is seen as a static or a 
dynamic institution is a matter of personal preference and of political-
philosophical opinions. Only those lawyers engaged in legal theory who 
think or believe - in one way or another - that the law could and should 
play a role in changing existing gender relations, or even in abolishing 
gender inequality, are in need of a non-essentialistic theoretical perspec-
tive on gender relations. So, this need is more prevalent for those who 
defend a substantive than for those who defend a formal application of 
sex-equality in law (see section III.B.) 
According to Scott, the only type of gender theories that are 'causal' 
but not essentialistic, are theAnglo-American (psycho-analytical) object-
relation theories and the French post-structuralist (or postmodern) 
language theories. After having presented a- in my view unclear- mix-
ture of both theories, Scott ends up with a description of what the content 
and use of the concept of gender in scientific research could be. As cited 
above, Scott presents a two-fold definition of gender (see section IV.B.). 
Gender is: 
434 
The Issue of Overtime Payments for Part-time Workers in the Helmig Case 
1) a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived 
differences between the sexes, and 
2) a primary way of signifying relationships of power. 
She then goes on to state that from the first part of her definition it 
follows that gender involves four perceived elements.64 These are: 
1) culturally available symbols that evoke multiple (and often 
contradictory) representations of the male and the female; 
2) normative concepts that set out interpretations of the meanings of 
the symbols and that attempt to limit and contain their metaphoric 
possibilities; 
3) the notion of politics and social institutions and organizations that 
lead to the appearance of timeless permanence in gender 
representation; 
4) the construction of subjective gender identities. 
I think feminist legal scholars can derive inspiration from these four 
elements mentioned by Scott, to 'tackle' the law, as one of the institu-
tions, but also as one of the systems of meaning, that produce and 
reproduce gender. A few examples might show how this can be done and 
what kind of results you may expect from such an analysis. 
The first element mentioned can be traced in the law quite clearly. 
Symbols like strongness and weakness, autonomy and dependency, 
objectivity and subjectivity, rationality and emotionality, generality and 
specificity, public and private, rights and needs, etcetera, are very 
common 'denominators' when 'classifying' groups or situations that fall 
inside and outside the scope of law. These denominators also symbolize 
a gendered classification: the first of each pair representing the male, the 
second representing the female aspect. It will come as no surprise that 
the symbols that represent the male are more closely connected with the 
law (are inside the law) and that those which represent the female are 
mostly outside. So law is objective and rational, general and public and 
'grants' strong rights to autonomous individuals, while- on the other side 
of the spectrum- words like dependency, subjectivity, specificity, private 
life, etcetera are used to describe the areas of social life or the groups of 
people who can not fall within the scope of law. Not surprisingly, these 
areas are often areas that are of crucial importance to women.65 
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The second element is, in my view, also of great importance to feminist 
legal theories based on gender-analysis. Scott describes the second point 
as follows: 'These concepts are expressed in religious, educational, 
scientific, legal and political doctrines and typically take the form of a 
fixed binary opposition, categorically and unequivocally asserting the 
meaning of male and female, masculine and feminine. In fact, these nor-
mative statements depend on the refusal or repression of alternative 
possibilities, and sometimes, overt contests about them take place [ ... ] 
The position that emerges as the dominant, however, is stated as the only 
possible one.' 66 I will only give one example to illustrate this mechanism, 
and that is the normative concept of time as expressed in different legal 
doctrines. Time in law almost always refers to a linear, clock-wise idea, 
which can be divided into such entities as work time and free time. Com-
pare the way AG Darmon referred to time in his opinion in the Helmig 
case. Time, in his story about the case, only serves for work or for leisure. 
Another example can be found in the Dutch Labour Law. In Holland, 
women have the 'right' to breast-feed their child at the workplace. (Arti-
cle 11, paragraph 2 of the Arbeidswet). Consequently the employer must 
provide for a quiet and private room where she can feed the child and 
must allow her 'reasonable' time off to do so. The employer is, however, 
not obliged to ensure that the child is with the mother all day or to provide 
a space where it can be kept at the workplace. This means that the child 
must be brought to the mother every time it is hungry, something which 
is virtually impossible in most situations. The cyclical 'needs' of the child 
thus have to be 'organised' into a time schedule. At regular times, 
somebody must pick the child up at home or at the daycare centre and 
bring it to the mother. The law, although it takes the biological needs of 
breastfeeding mothers and their infants into consideration, is not 
considerate of the (not clock-bound!) biological rhythm of infants' hunger. 
The lack of a provision making it possible to keep the mother and her 
child physically close (at the workplace) forces both into a linear schedule 
of feedings. 
The third element, mentioned by Scott, is perhaps the least obvious, 
but is nevertheless of major importance. Scott here refers to 'general' 
institutions, such as the political system or the law itself, which have a 
certain 'air' of gender-bias or even gender-neutrality about them. 'Politics' 
is deemed to be a 'male' institution, 'the family' to be a female institu-
tion. The law is 'encoded' with neutrality, also with gender-neutrality 
since the most obvious instances of out-right sex-discrimination have been 
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erased and formal equality of the sexes has become the rule (at least in 
most Western countries). One of the main objectives of feminist legal 
studies in the past decades has been to 'decode' this kind of 'neutrality' 
and show the male bias on which it is founded. Though, in some respects, 
this has been quite successful, the idea of law's neutrality is still all-
pervasive and a lot of work still has to be done in that respect. 
The fourth element, the construction of subjective gender identities, is 
also a mechanism that takes place through the law. Carol Smart offers us 
the examples of the 'unwed mother', the 'female criminal' and the 
'prostitute' .67 In my own work, I have analysed the construction of the 
'legal identity' of the 'welfare mother' .68 Thirty years ago, we did not have 
such a 'phenomenon', but nowadays everybody knows what you are 
talking about when you use this phrase. Welfare mothers 'experience' to 
exist, and they often call themselves by this name. The welfare mother's 
position is of a social but also of a legal nature: what she is is defined by 
the law. From this analysis, it appears that quite subtle and hidden 
mechanisms are responsible for bringing about this new 'personality' into 
the legal and societal community we live in. The analysis also shows that 
we can not substitute the term 'welfare mother' for the term 'welfare 
father'. As such the legal construct of a 'welfare mother' definitely is a 
gendered construction. 
B. Towards a Gender Theory of Law 
I think much work still has to be done in order to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of how gender operates in law. As I have 
attempted to illustrate with my analysis of the Helmig case, it is 'tricky' 
to engage in a strategy to bring about greater legal sex-equality, when 
one is not aware of the gendered nature of the concepts and procedures 
that are used in the law. This is not to say that I reject sex-equality law as 
an instrument towards more equal gender relations in the social and 
economic world.69 I only want to stress the necessity of theory, by which 
I mean theory that offers us new insights in the power of law. 
While the four elements of gender theory that Scott brought forward 
(see above) relate to the first part of her definition (gender as a constitu-
tive element of social relationships), and offer us possibilities in 
describing the ways in which gender 'operates' in this respect, the second 
part of her definition (gender as a primary way of signifying relationships 
of power) perhaps is of even greater importance to gender studies in the 
field of law. It offers us possibilities of investigating the reason why sex-
437 
Rikki Holtmaat 
inequality is persistent today and how it continues to reproduce itself. 
These signifiers are also mediated through the law: by using gendered 
categories in the law, the law itself reproduces and reaffirms the 
underlying (unequal) power relations between the two genders. With 
lawyers (especially of the 'formal' and 'liberal' type), it is very hard to 
discuss the power of law. Nevertheless, I think feminist legal scholars 
should consequently use this term in relation to their analysis of the law.70 
As we have seen in the case of Angelika Helmig and her five 'sisters', 
the power of definition and the power of procedure are both at work in a 
legal procedure in which sex-equality is at stake. These two mechanisms 
are responsible for the way sex-equality law (as it is applied) excludes, 
instead of includes, the 'real' experiences of these women.71 The 'story' 
of the six women, their experiences, their daily 'struggle' to cope with 
different- and often contradictionary- perceptions of time, is not 'heard' 
by the judiciary. And as far as it is heard (e.g. by the European Commis-
sion) it is immediately equated with the experiences of other workers (the 
traditional worker, who might not even really exist any more!). Equality 
then works as a mode of silencing instead of celebrating difference. 
Final Remark 
I think there is hardly 'one' conclusion to this paper. What I have tried 
to make clear in my analysis of the case, especially of the wording of the 
opinion of the AG and the judgment of the ECJ, is that 'strict scrutiny' of 
case-law can reveal both the gendered nature of the presumptions and the 
ways of reasoning that lawyers use in order to cover-up the systemic 
nature of gender-disadvantage in society and in law. The Helmig case is 
no worse then many other (welcomed!) cases, including many cases in 
which the ECJ adopted a more substantive approach to the legal equality 
issue. If each of the cases is scrutinized in the way I have scrutinized the 
Helmig case in this paper, feminist legal scholars will be able to find 
similar instances of gendered law. In the end, and this is the goal I strive 
for, it must balance the tendency towards assimilation and norm-
conformity that is inherent in the legal equality principle as it is structured 
in today's legal theory and practice. 
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Notes 
1 ECJ 15 Dec. 1994, in joined cases C-399/92, C-409/92, C-425/92, C-34/93, C-50/93 
and C-78/93, Angelika Helmig v. Stadt Lengerig and others. 
2 It is important to note that we are dealing here with legal equality. The principle of 
equality can also be considered from a political-philosophical vantage point or on a 
moral level (where it very often is equated with justice). Legal equality means the 
way in which positive law acknowledges the right to be treated as an equal. The way 
this right is guaranteed varies from country to country. In this paper I only deal with 
EC sex-equality law. 
3 There is extended evidence from 'time-survey-studies' (at least in Holland) that men 
spend their after working hours more on 'leisure activities' than women do, regardless 
of whether they work full-time or part-time. 
4 Ralph SANDLAND 'Between 'Truth' and 'Difference", Feminist Legal Studies 1995 
(1), p.28: 'Life is lost in the translation to law. Meanings are variously selected, 
rejected and refashioned to make them amenable to legal discourse.' 
5 I derive this summary from the opinion of the Advocate General in the case, 
A. G. Darmon, who delivered his opinion on April 19, 1994. The three questions 
correspond with the so-called Bilka-test for indirect discrimination, which will be 
explained in paragraph III.B of this paper. 
6 As we will see later in this paper, this is an extremely important point. The question 
of whether a substantive approach to equality could ever be successful depends to a 
great extent on the space claimants get in the legal procedure to tell their 'story'. 
When legal doctrine (such as the doctrine of indirect discrimination) forces you to 
phrase your 'questions' to the court in a certain manner, this might mean you have 
no space to speak and are silenced from the beginning. As such, as well as a close 
scrutiny of legal concepts from a gender perspective, it is also necessary to scrutinize 
legal procedures. 
7 As cited in the judgment. The report has not been published. This means that the 
European Commission was of the opinion that the situations of full-timers and part-
timers were comparable, thereby justifying equal treatment (as opposed to the ECJ, 
who thought hours were comparable). The problem of comparability will be dealt 
with in sections Ill and IV of this paper. 
8 Of course, the big issue is always how to establish which cases are equal and which 
cases are unequal (or 'different'). In each case, the lawyer must make choices, which 
are normatively (and politically) coloured. The purpose of a feminist approach to 
law is to show that the choices lawyers make are also choices on the bases of certain 
presumptions on gender-relations. 
9 
'Things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be 
treated unalike in proportion to their unlikeness.' As cited by Titia LOENEN, 
'Comparative Feminist Scholarship', Feminist Legal Studies, 1995, p.76. 
10 It should be noticed that theAG treats hours like abstract figures that can be numbered 
and counted. This he needs to do in order to end up with a formal approach to 
equality, in which the result of the comparison is often presented as sameness or 
complete identity. (See paragraph III.A.) From a theoretical point of view it would 
also be very interesting to analyse this statement from the perspective of how the AG 
constructs a superiority of general rules (that work in the abstract) above rules that 
favour diversity. Regretfully, I do not have the space to go into that subject here. 
11 The AG here refers to the Kowalska case, C-33/89. 
12 But then there are other purposes possible. In some lower paid professions, overtime 
is often worked on a regular basis by full-timers in order to earn a sufficient weekly 
income! I thank my colleague at the European Forum, David PURDEY, for his 
observation on this point. 
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13 The AG here refers to the second preliminary question. See paragraph 2.1 of this 
paper. 
14 The Norwegian Sociologist Helga Maria HERNES points to the basis of the problems 
women have with the way time is (legally and socially) structured. In her view, time 
can be differentiated into cyclical and linear time orders. 'Cyclical time is often 
considered to be the 'timeless' dimension, the world of the unchanging cyclicality of 
'life' itself. Linear time is man-made, historical time, the time we shape. Not 
surprisingly, different social institutions are associated with each of these: the family 
-and thus the life of women- mainly with cyclical time; the economic, professional 
and political sphere - and thus the life of middle class men - with linear time. These 
two time ordering principles ... impute and socialize us into different logics of action.' 
HERNES. See: 'Interest and Values Affected by Work Time Reforms'; Paper submitted 
to the workshop on theories of Gender and Power, ECPR, Gothenborg, April 1986, 
p.5. 
15 Bilka, C-170/84. See also the Hofmann case in which the ECJ phrased this as follows: 
'The Directive is not designed to settle questions concerned with the organization of 
the family, or to alter the division of responsibility between parents.' (C-184/83). 
The point is also discussed in the case Corn. v. France, C-312/86, in which the French 
government unsuccessfully tried to challenge this borderline between work in the 
workplace and work at home. See, for a commentary on both cases, Gillian MORE, 
'Equal Treatment of the Sexes in E. C. Law', Feminist Legal Studies, 1993 No.l, p.62. 
16 See Ralph SANDLAND, supra at p.28: 
'The preferred strategy of law is the promulgation of a focus on technicalities which 
bemuses and mystifies and allows law systematically to change the subject, thus 
giving rise to the possibility of legal non-discourse on sexuality and gender.' 
17 See the extensive description of the concept of indirect discrimination as developed 
by the Court in the article of Sacha PRECHAL, 'Combatting Indirect Discrimination 
in Community Law Context'; In: Legal Issues of the European Community, 1993, 
pp.81-97. 
18 See art. 5(1) of the Proposal for a Council Directive on the burden of proof in the 
area of equal pay and equal treatment for women and men (88/C 176/09). 
19 It is very attractive to think that this type of reasoning is 'objective'. As one of my 
students (Andrew SKUDDER, from Oxford University) observed in his paper: 
'By facing solely on the objective equality of the treatment actually received by men 
and women in this situation the Court referred to its old liberal approach to the 
question of equality.' 
However, later in his paper he problematized this 'objectivity' by exposing the gender 
biases on which the reasoning of the Court is based. 
20 The term 'purely' is often used with reference to formal equality. I use it as well, 
though I am aware of the danger of doing so: it falsely suggests that formality can be 
'pure' in the sense of 'neutral'. In part Ill of this paper, I will show that this can 
never be the case. 
21 It should also be observed that the Court here applies a symmetrical approach to 
equality, also related to as a sex-neutral approach to sex-equality. This means the 
Court does not ask itself whether a certain group really 'needs' the protection of 
equality legislation, or whether this legislation might only be designed to remedy 
inequality (or even dominance!), but applies the norm of equal treatment regardless 
of the social and economic position of the parties involved. Several feminist legal 
scholars have pleaded for an asymmetrical approach to equality. See, for example, 
the work of Titia LOENEN, which will be mentioned below. 
22 G. RADBRUCH, Rechtsfilosophie, Stuttgard, 1973 (1932), p.l66: 
'Gleichheit ist immer nur Abstraction von gegebener Ungleichheit unter einem 
bestimmten Gesichtspunkt.' 
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23 See, for example, article 4(2) and 4(3) of the second Directive (76/9). 
24 FENWICK & HERVEY 'Sex Equality in the Single Market: New Directions for the 
European Court of Justice'; The Common Market Law Review (1995) 32, pp.443-
470. 
25 Ibid., at p.469. 
26 Andrew SKUDDER, examination paper, L.L.M. Equality Course 1995. 
27 For non-legal readers, it is perhaps useful to explain here that positive action is 
something quite different from so-called 'special rights'. The first is the result of the 
(assumed) positive obligation of the State to bring about more social equality (see 
below under A2). The latter are the result of a recognition that women are in some 
respects different from men and therefore -according to the Aristotelian formula-
should be treated differently. The assertion in some special rights theories that (all!) 
women are different is essentialistic. It fixates sometimes on biological differences, 
and sometimes also includes cultural or psychological differences. See especially the 
work ofElisabeth WOLGAST, Equality and the Rights o.fWomen, London, !theca 1980. 
28 See supra note 9, Titia LOENEN, Feminist Legal Studies, 1995, No.1, p.77. 
29 This, however, does not automatically mean that better results will be achieved by 
legal intervention. See Carol SMART, 'Feminist Jurisprudence' in Dangerous 
Supplements, FITZPATRICK, ed., London, 1991, at p.144. 
30 I am aware of the fact that in the following summary of standpoints, I do not refer to 
an alleged important difference between the two standpoints relating to the 
application of the Aristotelian formula of equality. Some proponents of substantive 
equality (like LOENEN supra note 9, pp.76-77) claim that the formal approach only 
concentrates on the first part of the formula (treat likes alike), while only the 
substantive approach has an open eye to the second part (unlikes should be treated 
on-alike in proportion to the way in which they differ). I think this wrongs the formal 
approach. As a consequence of the procedural nature of this approach, it is evident 
that the accent will lie on establishing what cases should be treated alike, but that 
automatically entails an answer to the question of what cases should not be treated 
alike. What (different) treatment is necessary can not be answered on the basis of a 
formal approach as is possible on the basis of a substantive approach. The difference 
between the approaches does not lie in the question of on what part of the formula 
one concentrates herself, it lies in the different interpretation of the second part. This 
different interpretation, however, follows from the different political and legal choices 
on which both approaches are based, and which I will discuss in the next lines of 
this paper. 
31 As FENWICK & HERVEY show in their analysis of four recent ECJ cases, the judges 
tend to favour the liberal idea of autonomy and free choice. 'The concentration of 
women in certain types of paid work is seen as a result of individual choices, rather 
then as structural pay inequality to be redressed by the law.' supra note 24 at p.444. 
32 Sacha PRECHAL supra note 17, p.84, summarizes the test as follows: 
'If the use of a neutral criterion (i.e. applying equally to both sexes) affects a 
considerably larger percentage of persons of one sex, then this amounts to indirect 
discrimination and is illegal, unless the person suspected of this discrimination proves 
that his or her way of acting is objectively justified.' 
The objective justification test contains two separate sub-tests: the objective pursued 
must be a legitimate one and the means chosen must be appropriate and necessary to 
achieve the objective. 
33 This is demonstrated in the Danfoss case (C-109/88), where the ECJ held that 
flexibility was (sometimes) a 'suspect' category, while seniority was held to be 
justifiable in any case. In Nimz (C-184/89), however, the ECJ held that seniority may 
be un-justifiable. 
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34 The book by Evelyn ELLIS (Sex Equality Law in the European Community, 1991) 
and by PRECHAL & BURROWS (Gender Discrimination in the European Community, 
1990) contain a very complete overview until the beginning of the 1990's. I will not 
give you the complete list of articles here, but refer to the articles I mention in my 
footnotes in which you will find references to other material as well. 
35 Gillian MORE, supra note 15, p.70, comments as follows on the impact of the test: 
'Yet, the admission of an objective justification for measures having a discriminatory 
impact surely destroys the meaning of a disparate impact analysis. [ ... ] the fact that 
the law or policy may be objectively justified does nothing to remove the unfair 
burden. The objective justification is yet another abstract legal concept, which enables 
both lawyer and judge to distance themselves from the concrete reality of the case.' 
36 In feminist legal studies much attention has been given recently to this aspect of court 
proceedings. Are women silenced in law or does it offer them the opportunity to 
communicate their life experiences? A nice example of an article in which this 
question is addressed is that of Lucy WHITE: 'Subordination, Rhetorical Skills and 
Sunday Shoes; notes on the hearing of Mrs G., 38 Buffalo Law Review, 1, 1990. 
37 This is also an important point in the work of Carol SMART. See also 
J. E. GOLDSCHMIDT & R. HOLTMAAT, Trendrapport Vrouw en Recht, Den Haag, DCE/ 
STEO, 1993. 
38 Elsewhere (SeeR. HoLTMAAT, 'The Power of Legal Concepts; Towards a Feminist 
Theory of Law', International Journal of Sociology of Law, Dec. 1989, No.5, pp.481-
502). I have developed a critique of the equality principle as such. I will not repeat 
that here. 
39 A classic article on this subject is that of Ann ScALES, 'The Emergence of Feminist 
Jurisprudence: an Essay', Yale Law Journal95 (1986), pp.1373-1403. 
40 I will deal with the issue of norm-conformity in more detail below, paragraph IV.B. 
41 I will return to these terms in paragraph IV.C. 
42 Joan W. SCOTT, 'Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or the Use of 
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism', Feminist Studies 14 (1988) No.1, pp.33-50. 
I use the Dutch translation here, as published in: tiende jaarboek voor 
vrouwengeschiedenis, Nijmegen p.112. 
43 See, for an example, FENWICK & HERVEY, in part 1 of their article: 
'Substantive equality[ ... ] demands[ ... ] that the real situation of many women which 
may place them in a weaker position in the market should be addressed.' 
44 Carol SMART, in her critique on existing feminist legal theory goes so far as to say 
that in the end this ends up in an essentialistic stance. (Carol SMART, 'Feminist 
Jurisprudence', in Dangerous Supplements, P. FITZPATRICK (ed.), London, 1991.) I 
would not go as far as that, though, as I will show below, there certainly is a danger 
that- without realizing what they are doing- some adherents of substantive equality 
enhance quite 'suspect' theories. See also on the point of essentialism in feminist 
legal studies: Diana BROOKS, 'A commentary on the essence of Anti-Essentialism in 
Feminist Legal Theory' Feminist Legal Studies, 1994 No.2, pp.llS-132. 
45 Joan W. SCOTT, 'Gender: a Useful Category of Historical Analysis', in E. WEED (ed.), 
Coming To Terms, London 1989, p.94. The article was first published in the American 
Historical Review, 91 (Dec. 1986) pp.1053-1075. 
46 Joan W. SCOTT brilliantly shows us how this process plays out in equality cases by 
her analysis of the so-called Sears case (brought before the US Supreme Court). See 
'Deconstruction' supra note 42. 
47 At least, not a discrimination case under article 119 of the Treaty. Perhaps they could 
have tried to bring a case under a national law that forbids unequal treatment (on any 
ground) of workers by their employer. Sometimes rather general and vague norms 
are suitable for this. In Holland, one could try to ban unequal treatment of part-time 
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workers through the application of the norm that every employer should treat his/her 
employees 'as a good employer' (art. 7A:1638z of the Civil code). 
48 As I do not have the full dossier of the case at hand while writing this paper, I can 
not evaluate whether the claimants tried to do this but failed. A further analysis of 
the case is necessary to clear this point. 
49 OECD, Shaping Structural Change, Paris 1991. 
50 Even some forms of indirect discrimination are quite overt, like the concept of 
breadwinnership or the exclusion of part-time workers. It is not difficult to establish 
that women disproportionably suffer from these type of categorizations. 
51 See Deirdre CURTIN, 'Simple Justice; Steps towards Eliminating Sex-based Wage 
Discrimination', Nemesis, Dutch Journal on Women and Law, 1993, pp.190-198. 
52 Enderby, C-127/92. 
53 FENWICK & HERVEY, supra note 24 at p.463. 
54 Titia LOENEN, Feminist Legal Studies 1995, No.1, supra note 9 p.81. 
55 See my remarks on this point in 'The power of legal concepts', supra note 38 p.495, 
where I take the stance that '[A]ny feminist theory of law should be based on a 
feminist theory on the nature and causes of the oppression of women.' 
56 The already mentioned article of Gillian MORE gives us an example, as well as the 
already mentioned article by FENWICK & HERVEY (see footnotes 8 and 78 in their 
article). See Also S. FREDMAN, 'European Community Discrimination Law; a 
Critique', Industrial Law Journal (1992), pp.ll9-134. 
57 This is not to disqualify her theory in all respects. It is only to warn that it may entail 
the danger of reproducing the 'natural' differences between the male and the female 
as fixed categories. See Diana BROOKS, supra. 
58 See, for example, Joan W. ScoTT, op. cit., supra note 45 p.86: 
'Although sexual relations are defined in MacKinnon's analysis as social there is 
nothing except the inherent inequality of the sexual relation itself to explain why the 
system of power operates as it does ... [T]he analysis rests on physical difference. 
Any physical difference takes on a universal and unchanging aspect, even if theorists 
of patriarchy take into account the existence of changing forms and systems of gender 
inequality.' 
59 An author who also works with a more comprehensive understanding of gender and 
who does so in the framework of feminist jurisprudence is Carol SMART, whose work, 
though at some points not reflecting all of my views on the 'nature' of law, offers 
very useful insights in the way law operates as a system of power that - among 
others- is based on gender. In 1991, I published a review of Carol Smart's main 
work: Feminism and the Power of Law (London, 1989) in Nemesis, the Dutch Journal 
on Women and Law. I particularly disagree with Smart over whether any changes in 
the fixed gendered nature of the law are possible, about which I am far more 
optimistic than she is. See also Carol SMART, The Women of Legal Discourse, Social 
and Legal Studies, 1 (1992) pp.29-44. 
60 This is not to say that we should all agree on one and only one theory. It is only to 
say that those who engage in feminist legal theory should make their ideas about this 
matter more clear and that an open discussion about different theoretical approaches 
should take place. Moreover, I do not think one 'grand theory', in which a mono-
causal explanation of all forms of oppression in all cultures and in all times is given, 
does exist or can be developed. 
61 Joan W. ScoTT, op. cit., supra note 45 p.83. 
62 Joan W. ScoTT, 'Deconstruction', supra note 42 p.112. 
63 E. WoLGAST, for example, quite overtly theorizes on the basis of the natural 
differences between motherhood and fatherhood, thus justifying Special Rights for 
women. 
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64 Joan W. ScoTT, op. cit., supra note 45 at p.94. 
65 I analysed this mechanism in great detail, using as an example social security doctrine 
in which these symbols very often are used to distinguish between areas of life that 
can be socially insured (by means of State social security provisions) and those areas 
that can not (and which at the best are 'provided for' by means of social assistance). 
See my Ph.D. thesis: Met Zorg een Recht?, (To care for a right?) Zwolle 1992, with 
a summary in English. 
66 Joan W. ScOTT, op. cit., supra note 45 at p.94. 
67 Carol SMART, 'The Women in Legal Discourse', Social and Legal Studies, (1) 1992, 
1, pp.29-44. 
68 Bijstandsvrouwen. De discursieve produktie van een nieuw type vrouw in het 
bijstandsrecht (Women on welfare. The discursive production of a new type of women 
through social assistance law) Paper for the conference on womens studies 
Amsterdam Nov. 1993, published in 1994 in Recht en Kritiek, 20 (3), pp.248-270. 
69 Thus it is not fruitful to suggest that one should make a choice between the equality 
approach and other approaches (as my proposal for 'other law'; see 'The power of 
legal concepts', supra note 38). I think this forces feminist legal scholars into a false 
dilemma. It is not as much a matter of being pro or contra sex-equality law, it is a 
matter of critical 'involvement' in the law, of which sex-equality legislation forms a 
part. 
70 In this respect, the already mentioned works of Carol SMART are very important for 
us. 
71 I want to stress that, in my view, these experiences should never be translated into 
the experiences of all women or of women as a certain category (e.g. working 
women). By using such a general category one - again - excludes difference. 
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